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This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policies in a non-scale growing economy with public and
private capital.  The equilibrium dynamics are characterized and we contrast the dynamic effects of
government expenditure on investment and expenditure on consumption under four alternative
modes of tax financing. Most of our attention focuses on the numerical simulations of a calibrated
economy.  The results emphasize the lengthy transition periods, which implies that policies have
sizeable level effects, leading to substantial welfare effects, even though long-run growth rates are
unaffected.  The paper highlights the intertemporal dimensions of fiscal policy and the tradeoffs
these involve for economic performance, especially growth and welfare.1
1. Introduction
An initial attraction of endogenous growth models was that they assigned a key role to fiscal
policy as a determinant of long-run economic growth.  However, these models have several
shortcomings, leading to a reassessment of their merits.  In particular, they are frequently associated
with “scale effects”, meaning that the steady-state growth rate increases with the size (scale) of the
economy, as indexed by say population.  Empirical evidence by Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe (1992)
for the United States, and by Jones (1995b) for OECD economies does not support such scale
effects.  Moreover, Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and others find at best weak evidence for the effects
of tax rates on the long-run growth rate, although Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) argue that
these results are biased because of the incomplete formulation of the government budget constraint.
These considerations have stimulated the development of non-scale growth models; see e.g.
Jones (1995a, 1995b).  These models have the advantage that they are consistent with balanced
growth under quite general production structures.  Indeed, if the knife-edge restriction that
generates endogenous growth models is not imposed, then any stable balanced growth equilibrium
is characterized by the absence of scale effects.  In this case the long-run equilibrium growth rate is
determined by technological parameters and is independent of macro policy instruments.
But the fact that the equilibrium growth rate is independent of tax rates does not imply that
fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance.  In fact quite the contrary is true.
Fiscal policy has important effects on the levels of key economic variables, such as the per capita
stock of capital and output.  Moreover, the non-scale model typically yields slow asymptotic speeds
of convergence, consistent with the empirical evidence of 2-3% per annum; see Eicher and
Turnovsky (1999).
1  This implies that policy changes can affect growth rates for sustained periods
of time so that their accumulated effects during the transition from one equilibrium to another may
therefore translate to potentially large impacts on steady-state levels.  Thus, although the economy
grows at the same rate across steady states, the corresponding bases upon which the growth rates
compound may be substantially different.
These considerations suggest that attention should be directed to determining the impact of2
fiscal policy on the transitional dynamics.  This is the focus of the present paper.  The model we
employ is of a one-sector economy in which output depends upon the stocks of both private and
public capital, as well as endogenously supplied labor.  Public capital introduces a positive
externality in production, so that the complete production function is one of overall increasing
returns to scale in these three productive factors.  In addition to accumulating public capital, the
government allocates resources to a utility-enhancing consumption good.  These expenditures are
financed by taxing capital income, labor income, and consumption, or by imposing non-
distortionary lump-sum taxation.  We set out the dynamic equilibrium of this economy and show
how the stable adjustment is characterized by a two dimensional locus in terms of the two stationary
variables, referred to as “scale-adjusted” per capita stocks of private and public capital.
The fact that the transitional paths are two-dimensional introduces important flexibility to the
dynamics.  Convergence speeds now vary over time and across variables, often dramatically,
allowing different variables to follow different transitional paths; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).
This characteristic is relevant to the empirical evidence of Bernard and Jones (1996), who find that
while growth rates of output among OECD countries converge, the growth rates of manufacturing
technologies exhibit markedly different time profiles.
  This contrasts with the standard one-sector
neoclassical growth model, or the familiar two-sector endogenous growth model in which the stable
locus is one-dimensional, thus constraining all variables to follow essentially identical time paths.
Our analysis focuses on two aspects.  First, we briefly discuss the steady-state equilibrium
and analyze the effects of various fiscal changes on the long-run labor-leisure allocation, the long-
run changes in the capital stocks, and output.  We compare the long-run effects of the two forms of
government expenditure – investment versus consumption – and changes in the alternative tax rates.
But most of our attention is devoted to calibrating the model to a benchmark economy and
assessing the numerical effects of various policy shocks, relative to this benchmark.  To preserve
comparability, the shocks are standardized in their impact on the current government deficit.  Both
long-run equilibrium responses and the transitional adjustment paths are considered.  Particular
attention is devoted to the welfare of the representative agent, both the time profile of instantaneous
utility and his intertemporal welfare, as represented by the present value of the short-run benefits.3
The implications for the government’s intertemporal budget balance are also addressed.
The major contribution of the paper is to highlight the intertemporal dimensions of fiscal
policy and the tradeoffs these involve for economic performance, especially growth and welfare.
One general conclusion is that the relative merits of the two forms of public expenditure depend
upon their sizes relative to their respective social optima.  Calibrating the model to approximate the
US, we find a sharp contrast between government expenditure on consumption and government
expenditure on investment.  For the basic case of lump-sum tax financing, the former has a gradual,
but mild, uniform positive effect on welfare over time, with intertemporal welfare improving by
about 2%.  The latter involves a dramatic intertemporal tradeoff.  Consumption and welfare decline
in the short run, as resources are attracted toward government investment, but improve sharply over
time as productivity is enhanced, and intertemporal welfare improves by nearly 8%.
Similar tradeoffs exist for standardized increases in distortionary taxes.  Taxing capital yields
the greatest immediate benefits in that it diverts resources away from capital accumulation and
labor toward consumption and leisure.  But in the long run, taxing capital is undesirable, being
substantially worse than taxing labor income, which in turn is inferior to taxing consumption. These
effects are reflected in the comparison of compensated standardized fiscal changes.  Thus, for
example, financing an increase in government consumption expenditure by taxing capital is
contractionary in the long run, reducing long-run welfare by 1.34%, in comparison to the welfare
improvement of 0.42% with a consumption tax and 1.97% with lump-sum tax financing.
There is an extensive literature analyzing fiscal policy on capital accumulation and growth
and before proceeding we should briefly indicate the relationship of this paper to that literature.
One strand is based on the AK models pioneered by Barro (1990) and Rebelo (1991).  Government
production expenditure in these models is usually introduced as a flow; see Barro (1990), Ireland
(1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), and Turnovsky (2000).  But
to the extent that productive government expenditure represents infrastructure it is more
appropriately treated as a stock.  Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) first adopt this approach in
an AK model with fixed labor supply, showing how the transitional dynamics are described by a
one-dimensional locus.  Baxter and King (1993) analyze the dynamics of fiscal policy in a4
stationary Ramsey model, emphasizing the role of government capital on output.  The present
analysis also addresses this in a growing economy, though focusing on a broader set of fiscal
policies and stressing the intertemporal welfare tradeoffs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 sets out the model, while its
equilibrium dynamics are characterized in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses some of the long-run
comparative static properties.  Section 5 calibrates the model and considers the numerical effects of
a number of policy changes, while Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Model
The economy consists of N identical individuals, with population growing exponentially at
the steady rate  ˙ N = nN.  Each representative agent has an infinite planning horizon and possesses
perfect foresight.  He is endowed with a unit of time that can be allocated either to leisure, li, or to
labor, () 1− li , and produces output, Yi, using the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yl K K ii i G =−
− α
σσ η () 1
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where Ki denotes the agent’s individual stock of private capital, and KG is the stock of government
capital, such as infrastructure.  We assume that the services derived from the latter are not subject to
congestion, so that KG is a pure public good.
2  The producer faces constant returns to scale in the
two private factors, and increasing returns to scale, 1+ η , in all three factors of production.
The representative agent’s welfare is represented by the isoelastic utility function:
Ω≡ () ()
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where Ci denotes the consumption of the individual agent at time t, H denotes the total consumption
services of a government-provided consumption good, and the parameters θ  and φ  measure the
impacts of leisure and public consumption on the agent’s welfare.
3  The remaining constraints on the
coefficients appearing in (1b) are imposed to ensure that the utility function is concave in
Cl H ii , , and  .  This specification is consistent with the allocation of time to labor and leisure being
constant along the balanced growth path.5
The agent’s objective is to maximize (1b) subject to his capital accumulation equation
˙ () () ( ) () Kr n K w lC T i k Ki w i ci i =− − − [] +− −−+ − 11 1 1 τδ τ τ  (1c)
where r = gross return to capital, w = (before-tax) wage rate, τ k = tax on capital income, τ w = tax on
wage income, τ c = consumption tax, TT N i =  = agent’s share of lump-sum taxes (transfers).
Equation (1c) embodies the assumption that private capital depreciates at the rate δ K, so that with
the growing population the net after-tax private return to capital is () 1−− − τδ k K rn .
Performing the optimization, yields:
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Equation (2a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the individual’s tax-adjusted shadow
value of wealth, λ i, while (2b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to its opportunity cost, the
after-tax real wage, valued at the shadow value of wealth.
4  The third equation is the standard
Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule, equating rate of return on consumption to the after-tax rate of
return on capital.  Finally, in order to ensure that the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint is met,







Aggregating over the individual production functions, (1a), aggregate output, Y, is
YN Y l N K K iG ==− []
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where KN K i =  denotes aggregate capital.  The equilibrium real return to private capital and the real











































The government accumulates capital, which depreciates at the rate δ G, in accordance with
˙ KG K GG G =−δ (5)
where G  denotes the gross rate of government investment expenditure.  It finances its gross
expenditure flows from aggregate tax revenues earned on capital income, labor income,
consumption, or lump-sum taxes, subject to its flow constraint:
G H rK w l N C T k wc += + − + + ττ τ () 1  (6)
where  CN C i ≡  denotes aggregate consumption.  We assume that the government sets its current
gross expenditures on the consumption good and the investment good as fixed fractions of output:
Hh Y = (7a)
Gg Y = (7b)
where h, g are chosen policy parameters.  Using (7a) and (7b), together with the optimality
conditions (4), we may express the government’s flow budget constraint as
Tg h C Y Y kw c =+ − − −− () [] τσ τ σ τ () 1 (6’)
so that T describes the lump-sum taxes necessary to balance the current budget.
Aggregating (1c) over the N agents and recalling (4 and (6) implies goods market clearing
˙ KYCGH K K =−−−− δ (8)








K =− − − 


 − 1 δ (9a)
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3. Equilibrium Dynamics
Our objective is to analyze the dynamics of the aggregate economy about a stationary growth
path.  Along such an equilibrium path, aggregate output, private capital stock, and public capital are
assumed to grow at the same constant rate, so that the output-capital ratio and the ratio of public
capital to private capital remain constant, while the fraction of time devoted to leisure also remains
constant.  Taking percentage changes of the aggregate production function, the long-run equilibrium














We shall show that one condition for the dynamics to be stable is that ση +< 1, in which case the
long-run equilibrium growth rate ψ > 0.  As long as government capital is productive, (10) implies
that long-run per capita growth is positive as well.
To analyze the transitional dynamics of the economy about its balanced growth path, we
express the system in terms of the stationary variables: (i) the fraction of time devoted to leisure, l,
and (ii) the scale-adjusted per capita quantities kK N ≡
−− − () () ( ) ;
11 σσ η   kK N GG ≡
−− − () () ( ) ;
11 σσ η
yY N ≡
−− − () () ( ) 11 σσ η .  Using this notation, the scale-adjusted output can be written as:
 5




In an expanded Appendix (available on request) we show how the equilibrium dynamics can
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Equation (12d) is obtained by dividing the optimality conditions (2a) and (2b), while noting (4).  It
asserts that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, θ Cl i , which grows
with per capita consumption, must equal the tax-adjusted wage rate, which from (4) grows with per
capita income.
  With leisure being complementary to consumption in utility, the equilibrium
consumption-output ratio thus increases with leisure.
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together with the production function, (11), and (12d).  These five equations determine the steady-
state equilibrium in the following sequential manner.  First, (13c) determines the output-capital ratio
so that the long-run net return to private capital equals the rate of return on consumption.  Having
determined the output-capital ratio, (13a) determines the consumption-output ratio consistent with
the growth rate of capital necessary to equip the growing labor force and replace depreciation, while
(13b) determines the corresponding equilibrium ratio of public to private capital.  Given  ˜ c, (12d)
determines the corresponding allocation of time, l.  Having obtained yk k k l g ,,    , the production
function then determines k, with kg then being obtained from (13b).
7
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We can readily establish that the determinant of the matrix has the same sign as () 1−− ση , so that
provided ησ <− 1  the determinant is positive, which means that there are either 3 positive or 1
positive roots.  This condition imposes an upper bound on the positive externality generated by
government capital.  Due to the complexity of the system we cannot find a simple intuitive condition
to rule out the explosive growth case of three positive roots, though in all of the simulations carried
out over a wide range of plausible parameter sets, 1 positive and 2 negative roots were always
obtained.  Thus since the system features two state variables, kk g  and   and one jump variable, l, we
are confident that the equilibrium is generally characterized by a locally unique stable saddlepath.
Henceforth we assume that the stability properties are ensured so that we can denote the two stable
roots by µ1,µ 2, with µ 2 < µ1 < 0.
4.  Some Steady State Fiscal Effects
Table 1 summarizes the long-run effects of fiscal changes on key economic variables.  By the
nature of the non-scale model, the long-run growth rate is unaffected.  The responses of the scale-
adjusted per capita quantities, kk y g ,,    and   are, however, important because they describe the effects
on the base levels on which the constant steady-state growth rates compound.  They represent the
accumulated effects on the growth rates during the transition, and as our numerical results shall
indicate, they can turn out to be substantial.  The responses reported in Table 1 assume that all
changes are accommodated by lump-sum taxes.  The main results are that an increase in government
consumption leads to proportionate increases in the two capital stocks and output, whereas an10
increase in government investment leads to proportionate increases in private capital and output but
leads to a larger relative increase in public capital.
 8  An increase in the tax on capital reduces public
capital and output proportionately, but leads to a larger relative decline in private capital.  In contrast
a higher wage or consumption tax reduces both types of capital and output proportionately.
9
5. Numerical Analysis of Transitional Paths
Further insights into the effects of fiscal policy can be obtained by carrying out numerical
analysis of the model.  We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, calibrating the model
using the parameters representative of the U.S. economy summarized in Table 2.
The elasticity on capital implies that approximately 35% of output accrues to private capital
and the rest to labor, which grows at the annual rate of 1.5%.  The elasticity η = 02 0 .  on public
capital implies that public capital generates a significant externality in production.  It is smaller than
the extreme value (0.39) suggested by Aschauer (1989) and lies within the range of the consensus
estimates; see Gramlich (1994). The elasticity of 0.3 on government consumption implies that the
optimal ratio of government consumption to private consumption is 0.3 and is close to the
corresponding observed ratio for the US over the 1990s of around 0.28.
The value of γ =− 15 .  implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.4, close to that
estimated by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), and well within the standard range of estimates. The
elasticity θ = 17 5 .  accords with the standard value in the business cycle literature and yields an
equilibrium fraction of time devoted to leisure of around 0.7, consistent with the empirical evidence.
Our benchmark tax rate τ w = 0.28 reflects the average marginal personal income tax rate in
the United States.  Given the complexity of capital income taxes, part of which may be taxed at a
lower rate than wages, and part of which at a higher rate, we have chosen the common rate
τ k = 0.28 as the benchmark.  The benchmark assumes a zero consumption tax.  Government
expenditure parameters have been chosen so that the total fraction of net national production devoted
to government expenditure on goods and services equals 0.20, close to the fraction in the United
States during the 1990s.  The breakdown between h = 01 6 .  and g = 00 4 .  is based on the US
evidence, suggesting that approximately 80% of government expenditure is on consumption.  The11
annual depreciation rates δ K = 00 5 .  and δ G = 0 035 .  approximate the average depreciation rates for
public and private capital for the United States during recent years.
10
These parameters lead to the benchmark equilibrium, reported in Table 2.B.  The implied
fraction of time allocated to leisure, l = 0.71, accords with the empirical evidence, as noted.  Also,
the consumption-output ratio = 0.66, the output-private capital ratio = 0.52, and the ratio of public to
private capital = 0.37, are all plausible and generally consistent with the empirical evidence for the
United States suggesting that during recent years, CY = 0.67, YK  = 0.48 and KK g  = 0.30.
11  The
table also reports the two stable eigenvalues, which for the benchmark economy are approximately
–0.030, and -0.096.  These imply that per capita output and capital converge at the asymptotic rate of
approximately 2.3%, consistent with much of the empirical evidence.
12  Finally, the steady-state
growth rate, which by the non-scale nature of the economy is independent of policy, equals 2.17%.
Table 3 describes the consequences of various policy changes and includes three measures of
economic performance: instantaneous (short-run) welfare, intertemporal (long-run) welfare, and
intertemporal fiscal balance.  Intertemporal welfare is the representative agent’s optimized utility:
W Z t e dt C N l H e dt
tt ≡≡
− ∞∞ − ∫∫ () ( ( ) )




where  Zt ()  denotes instantaneous utility (short-run welfare) and CN lH ,,    are evaluated along the
equilibrium path.  The welfare gains reported are calculated as the percentage change in the flow of
income necessary to equate the initial levels of welfare (both long run and short run) to what they
would be following a policy change and formal expressions are reported in the Appendix.
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The other quantity is a measure of the intertemporal fiscal balance.  Recalling equation (6’),
T represents the amount of lump-sum taxation (or transfers) necessary to finance the primary deficit
and is therefore a measure of current fiscal imbalance.  Defining
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where  sr kk K () () 11 −≡−− ττ δ  is the implied equilibrium rate of interest, V measures the present
discounted value of the lump-sum taxes or transfers necessary to balance the government budget
over time, and thus is a measure of the intertemporal fiscal imbalance, expressed as a surplus.  For12
the assumed tax rates and expenditure parameters, current tax revenues exceed government
expenditures on goods and services by around 8% of current income.
14  Evaluating (16) along the
balanced growth path we find that in the benchmark case, V = 0.314 and thus implies an
intertemporal fiscal surplus.
15  In interpreting this, we should bear in mind that our measure of T and
therefore V is net of government transfers, which historically for the United States have been of the
order of 12% of current income, implying an overall deficit.  Table 3 reports percentage changes in
the intertemporal fiscal surplus, with a negative change implying a reduction relative to the base.
5.1 Uncompensated Normalized Fiscal Changes
Table 3.A describes various basic policy changes from the benchmark economy.  These are
uncompensated, meaning that they lead to changes in the government’s current fiscal imbalance, T.
However, to preserve comparability, they have been standardized so that the two expenditure
increases lead to the same decrease, and the three tax increases lead to the same increase, in the
government’s current surplus (− T in equation (6’)), respectively.
16  With expenditures being tied to
the same measure (income) the changes in g and h are virtually identical, whereas with the taxes
being applied to differential bases, the changes in the normalized tax rates are different.  Examples
of dynamic transition paths are provided in Figures 1 and 2.
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Increase in government consumption expenditure:  An increase in h of 0.04 increases long-run
private capital, public capital, and output proportionately by 6.6%, while crowding out the long-run
private consumption–output ratio by 0.04, with a corresponding reduction in leisure of 1.3
percentage points.  The additional government expenditure leads to a substantial deterioration in the
government’s long-run balance; the intertemporal surplus, V, is reduced by 50%.
The immediate effect of the lump-sum tax financed increase in expenditure is to reduce the
private agent’s wealth, inducing him to supply more labor, thereby raising the marginal productivity
of both types of capital, and raising output. The dynamic responses of this shock are shown in the 4
panels of Fig. 1.A.  The phase diagram (i) indicates that the two capital stocks accumulate roughly
proportionately.  This is also reflected in their growth rates, illustrated in (ii), which both jump
initially to around 2.4% and gradually decline to their steady-state rates of 2.17%, as both types of13
capital accumulate and their respective rates of return decline.  The initial increase in labor supply
(which remains virtually unchanged thereafter), and the associated decline in consumption, are
welfare deteriorating, though this loss is more than offset by the direct benefits from the increase in
public consumption expenditure.  The initial expenditure increase raises instantaneous welfare by
0.66% and this grows uniformly with the growth in the capital stocks and output, to an asymptotic
improvement relative to the benchmark of over 4%, with (15) implying an overall intertemporal
welfare gain of nearly 2%.
Increase in government investment expenditure:  The normalized increase in g is 0.0396, and apart
from the effects on employment and the consumption-output ratio, the effects are dramatically
different from those resulting from the comparable increase in h.  Long-run private capital and
output increase by 44.6%, while public capital increases by 288%, doubling the long-run ratio of
public to private capital.  The reduction in the intertemporal fiscal surplus is slightly larger, due to
the expanded effect on output, and thereby on government expenditure.
The contrast with government consumption is reflected in the dynamics and is highlighted in
Fig. 1.B.  The initial claim on capital by the government crowds out private investment, so that the
growth rate of private capital is reduced below the growth rate of population; the scale-adjusted
stock of private capital therefore initially declines.  By contrast, public capital initially grows at over
7% (see (ii)).  The reduction in initial consumption and leisure, with no public expenditure benefits,
leads to an initial reduction in welfare of 2.9% (Fig. 1.B(iv)). As the new public capital is put in
place, its productivity raises the growth rate of private capital, and as output and consumption grow,
so does welfare.  Asymptotically, instantaneous welfare increases 35% above the base level, and the
overall intertemporal welfare gain, derived from (15) is around 7.8%.
Increase in Tax on Capital: Row 3 raises the tax on capital income from 0.28 to 0.40.  This has a
dramatic long-run effect, reducing private capital by about 30% and public capital and output by
around 16%, raising both the output-private capital and public capital-private capital ratios by 20%.
The reduction in long-run capital reduces the productivity of labor, causing a long-run substitution
toward more leisure and consumption. The higher tax revenues increase the government’s14
intertemporal surplus by 80%.
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The dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 2.A.  Upon impact, the higher capital tax reduces the
growth rate of private capital almost to zero, so that the scale-adjusted per capita stock, k, begins to
fall rapidly.  The reduction in labor, all of which occurs virtually on impact, and the reduction in
private capital reduces the growth rate of output, and the growth rate of public capital begins to fall
as well, so that k and kg follow the declining paths in Fig. 2.A.(i).  As private capital increases in
relative scarcity its productivity rises, inducing investment in private capital and thereby restoring its
growth rate.  This in turn raises the productivity of public capital, the declining growth rate of which
is reversed after 15 periods.  In the short-run the higher capital tax raises welfare by nearly 4%.  This
is because of the short-run increase in leisure, which induces an increase in consumption.  However,
the steady decline in relative consumption implies that over time, instantaneous welfare falls rapidly
relative to the benchmark, declining asymptotically by about 15%.  The decline in intertemporal
welfare, (15), is equivalent to a 3.56% reduction in base income.
Increase in Tax on Wage Income and Consumption:  Rows 4 and 5 consider an increase in the wage
tax from 0.28 to 0.349, and the introduction of a consumption tax of 0.0638, respectively, both of
which increase T by the same amount as did the capital income tax .  These taxes are qualitatively
similar and since in many respects the dynamics of the economy are similar to those of a decrease in
h, they are not illustrated; in particular public and private capital follow similar contractionary paths.
The contrasts with the capital income tax are quite striking.  Since both τ w and τ c fall more
directly on consumers, they have a significantly greater negative impact on labor supply.
Furthermore, although all three taxes raise the same impact on the current surplus, the capital income
tax has a far more substantial effect on the intertemporal surplus.  This is because of its more adverse
effect on output, and thus the implied reduction in the level of government spending.  The welfare
effects differ in two respects.  Whereas, the capital income tax leads to short-run gains followed by
large long-run losses, wage and consumption taxes lead to smaller, and steadily increasing, welfare
losses.  Overall, the capital income tax is the least desirable, as has long been argued.
1915
5.2 Compensated Changes
Many policy discussions focus on compensated fiscal changes, meaning that the policy
change is accompanied by some other accommodating change so that the current government deficit,
T, remains unchanged.
20.  Table 3.B describes a number of such changes.
Tax Substitution:  Row 1 introduces a 6% consumption tax, which permits income taxes to be
reduced to 24.03% to maintain the initial deficit, T, unchanged.  This change in the tax structure
raises long-run output and public capital by 5% and private capital by 10.8%, relative to the
benchmark economy.  The shift from the wage tax to the consumption tax causes a slight reduction
in long-run leisure, with a proportionately slightly larger reduction in the consumption-output ratio.
The government’s long-run fiscal surplus, V, deteriorates slightly.
The dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 2.B.  The reduction in the tax on income favors private
capital, the growth rate of which rises to over 2.8% on impact.  This stimulates the productivity of
public capital, the growth rate of which also rises in the short run, though more modestly.  The tax
switch causes an initial drop in consumption of 1% and an increase in labor supply of 1%, thus
leading to an initial deterioration in welfare.  However, the higher output level and resulting higher
consumption throughout the transition causes current welfare to improve over time, doing so by 3%
asymptotically, and a present value equivalent of nearly 1%.
Restructuring Government Expenditure:  Row 2 describes the case where the government changes
its expenditure priorities, while maintaining the initial deficit.  Specifically, it increases its
investment expenditure from 4% to 8% of output, and this requires it to reduce its expenditure on
consumption from 16% to 11.9% of output.  This switch in spending priorities has negligible effects
on long-run employment and the consumption-output ratio.  It raises long-run private capital and
output by 35.9% and public capital by 271.7%.  Long-run government fiscal surplus declines
slightly, but intertemporal welfare improves by 3.8%.  Space limitations preclude an illustration of
the dynamics.  But we may note that the initial switch toward government investment crowds out
private investment, the growth of which is initially reduced to around 1%, and thus the private scale-16
adjusted capital stock declines.  Public capital initially grows at over 6% and as its stock
accumulates, the productivity of private capital is enhanced and the incentives to invest increase.
Eventually, the decline in the private capital stock is reversed and it begins to accumulate
Alternatively-Financed Modes of Government Consumption Expenditure:  Rows 3 – 5 describe the
effects of increasing government consumption expenditure, h, from 0.16 to 0.20, under the three
alternatives of (i) consumption tax-financing; (ii) wage tax-financing; and (iii) capital tax-financing,
such that the initial deficit remains unchanged.  These effects can also be compared with those of
lump-sum tax financing summarized in Table 3.A, Row 2.  The dynamics of the capital stocks and
the corresponding time paths for instantaneous welfare are illustrated in Fig. 3.A
The striking contrasts in the effects of government consumption expenditure under
alternative modes of finance is dramically illustrated in the phase diagrams in panel i.  Suppose that
the initial equilibrium is at point A.  As discussed previously, a lump-sum tax financed increase in
government consumption expenditure is expansionary, increasing private and public capital
proportionately by 6.6% along AB.   If it is consumption tax-financed, the contractionary effect of
the tax just balances the expansionary effect of the expenditure and there is no net change; the
economy remains at A.
21  If it is wage tax-financed, private and public capital again move
proportionately.  However, this time, the contractionary effect dominates the expansionary effect and
both stocks decline by around 3% along the direction AC.  Finally, if the expenditure is financed by
a tax on capital, the contractionary effect on capital is more than proportionate, and the economy
evolves along AD, with a larger contraction in both capital goods.
These responses are reflected in the time paths for welfare illustrated in panel ii.  As noted
before, under lump-sum tax financing there is a uniform steady improvement in current welfare from
0.66% to 4%, relative to the benchmark, which in present value terms is nearly 2%.  Although the
consumption tax has no effect on activity and therefore no induced impact on welfare, the higher
government consumption expenditure being financed does have a direct uniform welfare benefit, the
present value of which is 0.42%.  Under wage-tax financing, there are small short-run benefits
associated with the higher expenditure, but these are more than offset by the longer-run losses as the
economy contracts, leading to an overall long-run small welfare loss of 0.46%.  The intertemporal17
tradeoff in welfare is more dramatic when the expenditure is capital tax financed.  In that case, the
reduction in private capital accumulation and employment, together with the switch in private
consumption and the higher government consumption, lead to a short-run welfare gain of about
4.8%.  However, this quickly erodes as the economy contracts, leading to an asymptotic reduction of
around 8%, and an overall intertemporal welfare loss in present value terms of nearly 1.34%.
Alternatively-Financed Modes of Government Production Expenditure:  Rows 6 – 8 describe the
corresponding effects of increasing government investment expenditure from 0.04 to 0.08.  These
can also be compared with those of lump-sum tax financing summarized in Table 2.A, Row 3.  The
dynamics of capital and instantaneous welfare are illustrated in Fig. 3.B.
While the time paths for the two capital stocks exhibit interesting differences across
financing modes, these differences are less dramatic than in the previous case of government
consumption expenditure.  In all cases government capital increases steadily.  Private capital also
increases in the long run, although in the case of capital income tax-financing it is modest and
follows a substantial temporary decline during the transition.
The time profiles for the instantaneous welfare changes contrast sharply with those of
government consumption expenditure.  In the short run welfare declines by about 3% for the three
cases of lump-sum tax, consumption tax, and wage tax financing.  This is because the government
investment stimulates employment, leading to substitution from consumption, while providing no
initial direct benefits.  Over time, as the government investment yields its productive payoff and
output rises, instantaneous welfare in all cases rises steadily.  With lump sum tax financing it
converges to a higher long-run level of 35% above that of the benchmark economy, with a present
value of 7.85%, as shown in Table 3.A.  With consumption tax, wage tax, and capital income
financing the respective improvements in asymptotic welfare are 30%, 27%, and 18%, respectively,
yielding the corresponding intertemporal welfare gains of 5.92%, 4.83%, and 3.77%, respectively.
5.3 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
Two key parameters are φ , the elasticity of utility with respect to government expenditure,
and  η , the productivity of public capital.  While the values we have chosen are plausible, the18
empirical evidence on them is sparse.  The understanding of our results is therefore enhanced by
subjecting them to some sensitivity analysis.
The key issue concerns the actual size of the government, as represented by the expenditure
parameters,  g and h, relative to the socially optimal size, which depends crucially upon the
elasticities φη, .  In the Appendix we show that the chosen benchmark parameters, φη == 03 02 ., .
imply the socially optimal values  ˆ ., ˆ . gh == 0 0974 0 164   , and hence the optimal ratio of public to
private capital, kk g
^
. = 0 645.  Thus whereas the actual fraction of output devoted to government
consumption expenditure (0.16) is close to its social optimum, the fraction of output devoted to
government investment (0.04) is well below its social optimum, implying that the actual ratio of
public to private capital is also too small (for these assumed parameters).  While underinvestment in
public capital may indeed be characteristic of the United States, it is this expenditure imbalance that
accounts for the relative desirability of government investment over government consumption.
Suppose instead, we reduce the productivity of government capital to η = 01 . , an assumption
that may be consistent with substantial congestion in public capital.  In this case, the socially optimal
expenditure rates are  ˆ ., ˆ . gh == 00 5 01 7   , implying kk g
^
. = 03 3 , and both forms of government
expenditure are relatively close to their respective social optima.  We now find that the intertemporal
benefits of standardized increases in the two forms of government expenditures are approximately
equal (about 1.7% in each case), although the time paths of instantaneous welfare follow the patterns
of Figs. 1.A and 1.B.  The reason that there are any welfare gains is because we are maintaining the
income tax rates at their initial (non-optimal) levels.  If instead, the tax rates are set optimally, then
any deviation from the socially optimal government expenditure levels is welfare deteriorating.
For other (not necessarily plausible) combinations of φη  and  , one may infer that increasing
government consumption expenditure is preferable.  For example, maintaining η = 01 .  and
increasing  φ  to 0 45 .  we find that  ˆ ., ˆ . gh == 00 5 02 4 with kk g
^
. = 03 3 .  Now it is government
consumption expenditure that is below its social optimum, and that yields the greater benefits
(4.33% versus 2.15% for government investment).  In other extreme cases an increase in either form
of expenditure is welfare deteriorating.  For example, if φη == 01 5 00 5 ., ., so that neither form of
government expenditure is particularly beneficial, standardized increases in g and h from their19
benchmark levels reduces welfare by 1.88% and 1.65%, respectively.
We may also note that even for the benchmark parameters, φη == 03 02 ., ., where both forms
of government expenditure are relatively desirable, increases in g or h sufficiently above their
respectively socially optimal values may be welfare deteriorating.  The extent to which this occurs
depends upon where tax rates are set relative to their respective optimal values, as set in footnote 24.
We have also conducted sensitivity analysis with respect to θ  the elasticity of labor supply.
Here we find that our conclusions with respect to the impact of government policy are largely robust
with respect to this parameter, as also is the pattern of response of labor supply.  The reason is that
this parameter influences the equilibrium primarily through its impact on the equilibrium labor
supply, which is subject to relatively small changes.
6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effects of fiscal policies in a non-scale growing economy with
public and private capital.  We have characterized the equilibrium dynamics and have been
concerned with contrasting two types of government expenditure – expenditure on an investment
good and expenditure on a consumption good – under different modes of tax financing.  Most of our
attention has focused on the numerical simulations of a calibrated economy, which we have found to
provide helpful intuition.  We have obtained many results, of which the following merit comment.
1. Despite the fact that fiscal policy in such an economy has no effect on the long-run
equilibrium growth rate, the slow rate of convergence implies that fiscal policy has a sustained
impact on growth rates for substantial periods during the transition.   These accumulate to substantial
effects on the long-run equilibrium levels of crucial economic variables, including welfare.
2.  As examples of the accumulated impacts of policy, an increase in government investment
from 0.04 to 0.08 of output raises the long-run level of output by 44.6%.  Raising the tax on capital
income from 0.28 to 0.40 reduces long-run output by 16%.
3.  For the calibrated economy, devoting a fixed fraction of output to government investment
is better than allocating the same resources to government consumption.  However, the time paths of
the respective benefits are different.  The benefits of (lump-sum tax-financed) government20
consumption are uniformly positive; government investment involves short-run losses that are more
than offset over time.  But these comparisons depend upon the sizes of the two government
expenditures, relative to their respective first-best optima and may be reversed in other cases.
4.  The time paths and growth rates of private and public capital contrast sharply for policies
such as g and τ k, which impact on one or other capital stock directly; they move closely for those
fiscal shocks -- h wc ,, ττ  -- which do not impact directly on either form of capital.  The most dramatic
contrasts in the time paths for the two types of capital occur with respect to an increase in
government consumption expenditure, under the four alternative modes of tax financing.  Long-run
stocks of both increase proportionately under lump-sum taxes, remain unchanged under
consumption tax-financing, decrease proportionately under wage tax-financing, and lead to a more
than proportional decline in private capital under capital tax-financing.
5.  Our numerical simulations suggest the following welfare ranking for the different modes
of financing.  For either form of expenditure, lump-sum tax financing dominates consumption tax
financing, which in turn dominates wage tax financing and finally capital tax financing.
6.  The analysis highlights the intertemporal welfare tradeoffs involved in policy changes.
For example, both the substitution of a consumption tax for a uniform reduction in the income tax
and a revenue-neutral switch from government consumption to government investment lead to a
short-run welfare losses, which in both cases are more than offset by long-run welfare gains.  This is
a consequence of the growth generated during the subsequent transition.
7. The analysis also brings out tradeoffs between private intertemporal welfare gains and the
government’s long-run fiscal balance.  Table 3 shows that long-run welfare gains are mostly (but not
always) accompanied by a deterioration in the long-run government surplus and vice versa.  The
extent to which this occurs depends in part upon the actual fiscal mix relative to its social optimum.
It may be possible to design fiscal policy that is welfare improving, while leaving the government’s
long-run fiscal balance unchanged.
22
To conclude, it is useful to compare the numerical results we have obtained to the empircal
results of Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999).  Specifically, they find that whereas productive
government expenditure raises the growth rate (of output) and distortionary taxation reduces it, non-21
distortionary taxation and non-productive government expenditure have only weak statistically
insignificant positive effects.  These conclusions are mirrored by present results.  By assumption,
lumpsum taxation has no effects on the growth rate.  From Panels (ii) in Figs 1 we see that that the
short-run effects of government consumption is to raise the growth rate of output by about 0.10
percentage points over the first 5 years, whereas a comparable increase in productive government
expenditure will raise the growth rate by over 1 percentage point over that same time period.  From
Fig 2.A we also find that a tax on capital income will reduce the growth rate of output by almost 0.5
percentage points for an extended period of time.  Thus, while these authors focus on a narrower
range of issues, their empirical results provide quite compelling support for the present model.
Finally, we may observe that the quantitative implications we have obtained for the growth
rates and welfare along the transitional path in this non-scale model parallel those obtained in
simple endogenous growth models in which the economy is always on its balanced growth path,
and fiscal policy exerts permanent effects on the equilibrium growth rates; (c.f. Turnovsky (2000,
Table 1).  This suggests that to distinguish empirically between these two models will be difficult
and will require a careful analysis of the dynamic relationship between fiscal variables and growth.
Appendix
A.1   Steady-State Equilibrium in the Centrally Planned Economy
To help understand the numerical results it is useful to set out the steady-state equilibrium for
the centrally planned economy in which the planner controls resources directly.  The optimality
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where υ denotes the shadow price of a marginal unit of output in terms of capital, q denotes the
shadow price of public capital in terms of private capital, (and tildes are omitted). These equations
determine the steady-state solutions for cylkk q g ,, ,, ,, υ  in terms of the arbitrarily set expenditure
parameters g and h.  Equations (A.1a) and (A.1b) are analogous to (12d) and (13c), with the after-tax
prices being replaced byυ, determined in (A.1c).  In the absence of government expenditure, υ = 1.
Otherwise, the social value of a unit of output deviates from the social value of capital due to the
claims of government on output and the value this has for the consumer.
23  The final equation
equates the long-run net social returns to investment in the two types of capital.
Choosing the expenditure shares g and h optimally, yields the additional conditions
ˆ ; ˆ hc q == φ    1, and hence υ = 1. (A.1e)
The marginal benefit of government consumption expenditure should equal its resource cost, and the
shadow values of the two types of capital should be equal.  Substituting these conditions into (13b),
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For the benchmark parameters the socially optimal values are  ˆ ., ˆ . gh == 0 0974 0 164   .
A.2 Welfare Changes as Measured by Equivalent Variations in Income Flows
We assume that the economy is initially on a balanced growth path, which is growing at the
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where clh bb b ,,  are constant along the initial balanced growth path, Y0 is the level of income at time
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where clh Y aa a a ,, ,    denote the trajectories along the resulting transitional path and which in general
are time-varying.  As a means of comparing these two levels of utility, we wish to determine the
percentage change in the initial income level, Y0, (and therefore in the income flow over the entire
base path), such that the agent is indifferent between (,,) clh bb b and (,,) clh aa a.  That is, we seek to
find ζ  such that
Wc lh Y Wc lhY W bb b aa a a a (,,; ) (,,;) ζ 0 == (A.4)
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(A.5) determines the change in the base income level, and thus in the income level at all points of
time, that will enable the agent’s base level of intertemporal welfare to equal that following the
policy change.  Stating the comparison as in (A.4), highlights the fact that the fractions, cl h , , and 
are assumed to remain fixed at their initial base levels.
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1 This benchmark was established in early work by Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
Subsequent studies suggest that the convergence rates are more variable and sensitive to time periods
and the set of countries than originally suggested and a wider range of estimates have been obtained.
For example, Islam (1995) estimates the rate of convergence to be 4.7% for non-oil countries and
9.7% for OECD economies.  Evans (1997) obtains estimates of the convergence rate of around 6%
per annum.
2 This assumption is a polar one, since almost all public services are subject to some congestion.
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) develop a simple nonscale growth model in which productive public
expenditure, introduced as flow (as in Barro 1990), is subject to two types of congestion.  They
discuss the effects of both types of congestion on the long-run growth rate, the speed of convergence
and the equilibrium capital stock.  Although they do not address the issue, their model also implies
that congestion reduces the productivity of the public input.  The reduction in the productivity
parameter, η , briefly considered in Section 5.3 can be viewed as an initial attempt to take account of
congestion in this model.  Clearly, this is an important issue and is a dimension in which the present
model of public capital could be fruitfully extended.
3 Analogous to government capital, we assume that the government consumption good is a pure
public good, not subject to congestion.  The parameter γ  is related to the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, e say, by e =− 11 () γ .25
                                                                                                                                                                              
4 Since all agents are identical, each allocates his time identically, and henceforth we can drop the
agent’s subscript to l.
5 Under constant returns to scale, these expressions reduce to per capita quantities, as in the usual
neoclassical model.
6 We shall assume that Fl () . > 0   Sufficient conditions that ensure this is so include: (i) γ < 0, and
(ii) σ φ > , both of which are plausible empirically, and imposed in our numerical simulations.
7 Moreover, given the restrictions on utility and production this solution is unique, and economically
viable in the sense of all quantities being non-negative, and in particular the fractions
01 01 << << ˜ , ˜ cl , if and only if  11 1 1 −− () − () >+ + + − + [] + gh n kK K στ δ ψδρ γφ ψγ () ( ( )) .  This
condition holds throughout our simulations.
8 The fact that output changes in proportion to the two capital stocks, despite the less proportionate
change in employment, is a consequence of the overall increasing returns to scale of the production
function in the three factors.
9 The quantitative magnitudes of these effects corresponding to the discrete policy changes evaluated
at the benchmark steady-state values for the model as calibrated in Section 5 are provided in Table
3.A; see in particular columns 1, 5, 6, and 7.  The numerical magnitudes are discussed in conjunction
with the simulations discussed below.
10 Data on private and public stocks of capital have been obtained from the Table “Real Net Stock of
Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth for the US” in the Survey of Current Business, May 1997.
Data on gross public and private investment have been obtained from the 2002 US Economic Report
of the President (see Tables B2 and B21).  Using these data we have computed the average annual
depreciation rates on private and public capital over the period 1990- 1995 to be around 4.7% and
3.4%, respectively.  A depreciation rate of 5% is a common benchmark in the real business cycle
literature; see e.g. Cooley (1995).  We also experimented with higher depreciation rates (double),
with little effect on our conclusions, other than to yield a somewhat higher rate of convergence, but
still consistent with the empirical evidence.
11 These estimates have been computed from the sources cited in footnote 10.26
                                                                                                                                                                              
12 This estimate is based on the measure of convergence proposed by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).
An interesting feature of our results is that both stable roots are remarkably constant over all the
fiscal exercises conducted. The unstable root is much larger, and much more variable across policies.
This implies that the speeds of adjustments are fairly uniform across permanent fiscal changes,
though they may vary across temporary policy changes.  The speed of convergence is more sensitive
to structural changes, such as changes in the productive elasticities.
13As an explicit example, the long-run welfare gain of 1.98% reported in Table 3.A, Row 1 is
obtained as follows.  The base welfare in the absence of any policy change evaluated using (A.2)
yields W0 1932 62 =− . , while the welfare following the increase in h from 0.16 to 0.20, evaluated in
accordance with (A.3) yields W1 1860 24 =− . .  Applying (A.4) yields an equivalent variation of
income welfare gain of 1.98%.  The short-run welfare gain is computed analogously.
14This accords approximately with recent data on the surplus of government account on goods and
services.
15 Since both V and Y are proportional to α , set arbitrarily to 1, we interpret V as being measured in
units of income.
16 Given our choice of units, the base government surplus is 0.0188, which corresponds to 8% of
GDP.  Expenditure increases are standardized to reduce the surplus by 0.0091, thereby reducing the
surplus-GDP ratio by 4%, while tax increases are standardized to increase the surplus by 0.0091,
thereby increasing the surplus-GDP ratio by 4%.
17 One striking pattern throughout all simulations is that the labor supply responds to any shock
almost completely upon impact.  This is because for plausible parameter values the elements aa 31 32 ,
in the transitional matrix in (14) are both small relative to a33 0 > ; there is little feedback from the
changing stocks of capital to labor supply.  The dynamics of labor can thus be approximated by the
equation,  dl t dt a l t l () (() ˜) =− 33 , which for stability requires that l jump instantaneously to steady
state.
18 Policy discussions have raised the possibility that in a growing economy reducing the income tax,
particularly on capital, will stimulate growth and thereby improve the long-run government balance.27
                                                                                                                                                                              
This possibility, known as ‘dynamic scoring’ has been investigated in an AK model by Bruce and
Turnovsky (1999), who find that it may hold only in the unlikely case that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.  We have investigated this possibility in a number of
simulations and never found it to obtain. This is because any positive effects on the growth rate
occur only along the transitional path and are therefore only temporary.
19  Chamley (1986) originally showed that in the long-run the optimal tax on capital is zero.  This
result depends upon the absence of externalities and modifications of this proposition in the presence
of externalities and growth has been addressed extensively in the recent growth literature.
20 That is the deficit is held constant at its initial base level (see footnote 16).  As we shall see this,
has implications for the government’s long-run fiscal position.  An alternative exercise for which the
present model is well-suited is to impose the discipline of long-run or intertemporal revenue
neutrality on fiscal policy.  While this may be more interesting from a theoretical standpoint, it is
probably less relevant practically, in the sense that politicians are typically more focused on short-
run constraints.  But both aspects merit investigation.
21 The fact that a consumption tax-financed increase in government consumption expenditure has no
effect on (scale-adjusted) private capital, public capital, or output, can be shown analytically in an
expanded version of this paper.
22 The tradeoff between long-run fiscal balance and welfare for a simple static AK growth model has
been discussed in detail by Bruce and Turnovsky (1999).
23 With government expenditure tied to output, an increase in output diverts resources away from
private consumption, leaving 1−− gh  available to the agent.  Offsetting this, public investment
augments the stock of public capital, valued at qg, and provides utility benefits equal to φ c making
the overall value of output to capital as described in (A.1c).
24 Provided γ < 0, (A.1f) implies  ˆ g < η . Equating (A.1a) to (12d) and (A.1b) with (A.1c) to (13c),
the decentralized economy can replicate the steady state of the centrally planned economy if and
only if the tax rates satisfy 111 −= − + τττ kw c () ()   = s.  In the case that expenditures are set
optimally, this condition simplifies to  ˆ , ˆˆ ττ τ kw == − 0  c .  That is, capital income should remain28
                                                                                                                                                                              
untaxed, while the tax on consumption must be equal and opposite to that on wage income.  The
optimal tax must also be consistent with the government budget constraint. Given that the constraints
on tax rates, ττ wc <> 10 , , this may well require the supplementation by lump-sum taxation in order
to sustain the equilibrium.Table 1
Long-run Fiscal Changes
(lump-sum Tax financed)
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ασ η δ δ == = = = = 1 0 35 0 20 0 05 0 035 0 015 ,. ,. , . , . , .         KGn
e =− = = − = = = 1 1 04 15 00 4 17 5 03 () . , . , . , . , . γγ ρ θ φ  i.e.      
gh == 00 4 01 6 ., .  
τττ kwc === 0 28 0 28 0 ., .,   
B.  Base Equilibrium
lc yk ψ kk g µµ 12 , 
0.712 0.663 0.521 O.0217 0.368 -0.0296, -0.0960Table 3


































1.  Increase in h
from 0.16 to 0.20 -1.29 -0.04 0 0 6.57 6.57 6.57 -49.7 0.66 1.98
2.  Increase in g
from 0.04 to 0.0796 -1.23 -0.0396 0 199.0 44.6 287.7 44.6 -51.3 -2.90 7.85
3.  Increase in τ k
From 0.28 to 0.40 0.69 0.0229 20.0 20.0 -30.2 -16.2 -16.2 80.2 3.98 -3.56
4.  Increase in τ w
From 0.28 to 0.349 2.02 0 0 0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 55.1 -0.81 -2.88
5.  Increase in τ c
From 0 to 0.0638 1.25 0 0 0 -6.22 -6.22 -6.22 52.4 -0.45 -1.73


































1.  Tax substitution
ττ kw ==0 2403 .,
τ c = 00 6 .
-0.14 -0.0076 -5.23 -5.23 10.8 5.01 5.01 -3.68 -1.25 0.94
2.  Restructuring
gov. expenditure
gh == 0 08 0 119 ., .
0.03 0.0100 0 200.0 35.9 271.7 35.9 -4.47 -5.09 3.80
3.  Incr. in h,
financed byτ c
h c == 0 20 0 0642 ., . τ
-0.04 -0.0400 0 0000 -0.04 0.36 0.36
4.  Incr. in h,
financed by τ w
h w == 0 20 0 3433 ., . τ
0.61 -0.0400 0 0 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 1.24 0.16 -0.46
5.  Incr. in h,
financed byτ k
h k == 0 20 0 3952 ., . τ
-0.57 -0.0180 19.0 19.0 -24.6 -10.2 -10.2 16.2 4.77 -1.34
6.  Incr. in g,
financed byτ c
g c == 0 08 0 0642 ., . τ
0 -0.0400 0 200.0 36.1 272.2 36.1 -5.23 -3.17 5.92
7.  Incr. in g,
financed by τ w
g w == 0 08 0 3449 ., . τ
0.66 -0.0400 0 200.0 31.6 263.2 31.6 -4.03 -3.35 4.83
8.  Incr. in g,
financed byτ k
g k == 0 08 0 3952 ., . τ
























Fig. 1.A: Increase in Gov. Cons. Exp.
iii. Transition Paths, Rel to Benchmark Economy
iv. Time Path for Instant. Welfare Gains








Fig. 1.B: Increase in Gov.Inv. Exp.
i. Phase Diagram
ii. Growth Rates
















































laborFig. 2.A: Increase in Tax on Capital.
iii. Transition Paths, Rel to Benchmark Economy
iv. Time Path for Instant. Welfare Gains
Fig. 2.B: Subst. of Cons. Tax for Income Tax.
i. Phase Diagram
ii. Growth Rates

















































































outputFig. 3.A:  Alternative Forms of Financing
               Government Consumption Expenditure                
i.  Phase Diagrams ii.  Time Paths for Instant. Welfare Gains
ii.  Time Paths for Instant. Welfare Gains i.  Phase Diagrams

























































Fig. 3.B:  Alternative Forms of Financing
               Government Investment Expenditure                1
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